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Figure 1. Experimental results.
Left panel: judged time-to-collision increased monotonically as a function of actual time-to-
collision for non-threatening (butterflies and rabbits) and threatening (snakes and spiders) 
stimuli, F(4, 112) = 47.09, p < 0.0001. The light grey dotted line indicates veridical judgments. 
There was a clear bias to underestimate time-to-collision for threatening compared to non-
threatening stimuli, F(1, 29) = 12.35, p < 0.005. Right panel: scatterplot showing relation of 
time-to-collision judgments and fear. For both time-to-collision judgments and fear ratings, 
variance specifically related to the threatening stimuli was isolated by calculating the residuals 
regressing scores for threatening on those for non-threatening stimuli. These residuals were 
significantly negatively correlated, r(29) = –0.367, p < 0.05, indicating that greater fear was 
associated with increased underestimation of time-to-collision.Among the most critical of visual 
functions is the detection of 
potentially hazardous or threatening 
aspects of the environment. For 
example, objects on a collision 
course with an observer must be 
quickly identified to allow sufficient 
time to prepare appropriate 
defensive or avoidant responses. 
Directly approaching objects 
produce a specific accelerating 
pattern of optical expansion, 
known as ‘looming, which in 
theory exactly specifies time-to-
collision independent of object 
size or distance. Such looming 
stimuli have been shown to trigger 
stereotyped defensive responses 
in both monkeys [1] and human 
infants [2]. Psychophysical results 
in adult participants have similarly 
suggested sensitivity to looming at 
early stages of visual processing [3]. 
Such findings indicate specialization 
of the visual system to detect and 
react to such ‘looming’ stimuli, and 
have contributed to the traditional 
view of looming as a purely optical 
cue to imminent collision [1]. Here, 
we investigated whether the semantic
content of a looming visual stimulus 
affects perceived time-to-collision 
by manipulating its threat value. 
We show that time-to-collision is 
underestimated for threatening 
(snakes and spiders) compared 
to non-threatening (butterflies 
and rabbits) stimuli. Further, the 
magnitude of this effect is correlated 
with self-reported fear. Our results 
demonstrate affective modulation of 
the perception of looming stimuli, and
suggest that emotion shapes basic 
aspects of visual perception.
Participants made time-to-
collision judgments of looming visua
stimuli that expanded in size over 
one second before disappearing 
(see Supplemental Experimental 
Procedures for details). The rate of image expansion was consistent 
with one of five time-to-collisions 
between three and five seconds. 
Stimuli were photographs of 
animals, commonly perceived as 
threatening (snakes and spiders) 
or non-threatening (butterflies and 
rabbits). Participants were instructed 
to imagine each stimulus continuing 
to approach after it disappeared and 
to judge when it would have collided 
with them by pressing a button 
with their right hand at that exact 
moment.
Judged time-to-collision increased 
monotonically with actual time-
to-collision (Figure 1, left panel), 
though the rate of this increase 
was substantially less than would 
be predicted of an ideal observer, 
consistent with previous findings 
[4]. Critically, threatening stimuli 
were judged as colliding sooner than 
non-threatening stimuli. Though the 
pattern of optical expansion was 
exactly constant across conditions, 
the content of the looming stimuli 
nevertheless modulated perceived 
time-to-collision. Our data are 
consistent with previous results 
showing that humans are sensitive to 
looming as a cue to collision [4], but, 
critically, that these judgments are 
also affected by the semantic content 
of approaching stimuli.We further investigated whether 
the magnitude of this effect relates 
to individual differences in fear of 
snakes and spiders. We used a 
self-report questionnaire commonly 
used for clinical assessment of 
spider phobia (see Supplemental 
Experimental Procedures), and 
adapted the items by substituting 
each category name for the word 
‘spider’. To isolate individual 
differences in fear, we regressed 
fear ratings for threatening stimuli 
on ratings for non-threatening 
stimuli, and calculated the residuals. 
Similarly, we regressed time-to-
collision judgments for threatening 
on those for non-threatening stimuli, 
and calculated the residuals. 
These residuals were negatively 
correlated (Figure 1, right panel), 
indicating that fear of snakes and 
spiders was associated with larger 
underestimation of time-to-collision 
of these stimuli.
Experiment 2 controlled for 
potential low-level confounds in 
the images by comparing time-to-
collision judgments for the images 
used in Experiment 1 with scrambled 
versions of these images. Time-
to-collision judgments were again 
reduced for threatening compared to 
non-threatening stimuli. Critically, this 
effect disappeared for the scrambled 
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Increasing the number of options 
can paradoxically lead to worse 
decisions, a phenomenon known as 
cognitive overload [1]. This happens 
when an individual decision-maker 
attempts to digest information 
exceeding its processing capacity. 
Highly integrated groups, such 
as social insect colonies, make 
consensus decisions that combine 
the efforts of many members, 
suggesting that these groups can 
overcome individual limitations [2–4]. 
Here we report that an ant colony 
choosing a new nest site is less 
vulnerable to cognitive overload 
than an isolated ant making this 
decision on her own. We traced 
this improvement to differences 
in individual behavior. In whole 
colonies, each ant assesses only a 
small subset of available sites, and 
the colony combines their efforts to 
thoroughly explore all options. An 
isolated ant, on the other hand, must 
personally assess a larger number 
of sites to approach the same level 
of option coverage. By sharing the 
burden of assessment, the colony 
avoids overtaxing the abilities of its 
members.
Nest site selection by Temnothorax 
ants exemplifies collective decision-
making without well-informed leaders 
[5]. When a colony must find a new 
home, it can choose the better of two 
new sites even when no single ant 
assesses both. Instead, comparison 
emerges from a competition between 
recruitment efforts. Upon finding a 
site, an ant recruits nestmates to it 
with a probability that depends on 
the site’s quality, as determined by 
entrance diameter, cavity size, light 
level, and other features [6]. Her 
recruits make their own quality-
dependent recruitment decisions, 
creating positive feedback that 
directs the colony towards the 
better nest. Consensus is further 
enhanced by a quorum rule that 
accelerates recruitment once a 
site’s population has surpassed a 
threshold [5]. images, demonstrating that the 
effect is not driven by incidental 
stimulus-related characteristics. 
Further, threatening — but not 
non-threatening — stimuli were 
judged as arriving earlier than 
scrambled versions of the same 
images, suggesting that the effect is 
driven specifically by responses to 
threatening stimuli.
Experiment 3 investigated whether 
reduced time-to-collision judgments 
could reflect a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, such as 
heightened arousal. Participants saw 
threatening or non-threatening stimuli 
for one second, immediately followed 
by a looming blue disc. If the effect 
we report is a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, time-to-
collision judgments of the blue disc 
should be faster when preceded 
by images of threatening stimuli. 
Contrary to this prediction, priming 
images had no apparent effect on 
time-to-collision judgments of a 
semantically-neutral disc. 
Threatening stimuli are perceived 
as approaching more rapidly than 
non-threatening stimuli, especially 
for those who are fearful of those 
objects. These results show, in 
contrast to the traditional view of 
looming as a purely optical cue to 
object approach [1], that perceiving 
the time of imminent collision is 
not entirely driven by purely optical 
cues, but is also subject to emotional 
modulation. Gibson and colleagues 
[1] pointed out that as an optical cue 
to imminent collision, visual looming is 
a direct perceptual indicator of threat. 
Our results suggest that the affective 
content of looming stimuli also 
affects perceived time-to-collision. 
Underestimating arrival time of 
threatening stimuli may thus serve an 
adaptive role in leading responses to 
err on the side of additional time for 
either fight or flight. Some perceptual 
biases appear only for explicit 
perceptual judgments, but not for 
visually-guided actions [5]. Thus, it 
is possible that the present effect 
reflects a purely perceptual distortion 
that might not affect actions, such as 
catching.
Recent findings have demonstrated 
that emotion modulates some basic 
aspects of perception, such as visual 
contrast sensitivity [6], but not others, 
such as auditory directional attention 
[7]. The selectivity of emotional 
effects on perception is consistent with anecdotal reports that specific 
phobias may induce category-
specific distortions of perception [8]. 
Though we investigated variability 
in fear in an unselected sample (i.e. 
generally non-phobic), our results 
provide experimental evidence 
consistent with this proposal. Other 
recent results have also suggested 
that individual differences in fear, 
even in the non-clinical range, alter 
space perception. For example, 
fear of heights is associated with 
distorted perception of vertical 
distance [9], whereas claustrophobic 
fear is associated with increased 
size of the near space immediately 
surrounding the body [10]. The 
present results fit with and extend 
these by showing that emotion not 
only alters the perception of space 
as a static entity, but it also affects 
the perception of dynamically moving 
objects, such as those on a collision 
course with the observer.  
Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes experi-
mental procedures and two figures and can 
be found with this article online at  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.053.
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